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Argument
a. Appellee's supplemental facts are erroneous.
Contrarv to the assertions of Appellee in paragraph l'b" or his supplemental facts.
AMS eea.sed Us business and was dissolved by agreement of the parties. AMS ceased to
exist. AMS was not transferred "into a joint <50°(> 50" n) ownership" of Slone and Yeralynn
Porter. R. at 1654. ^ 30-32. The Porters formed a completely new company. QMS. which
was not a mere continuation of AMS.
In paragraphs "e" and "d" Appellee asserts that payments for the buy-out of AMS
were to be made from funds owned by the Porters. '1 heevidence, as referenced in Appellee's
brief clearly indicates that mone\ to fund the buwuit was intended to come from revenue
generated by QMS in doing work for 7-Pleven. Inc.. wInch was QMS" onl\ client, f he entire
buy-out agreement was premised on 7-Lle\en. Inc. continuing to do business with QMS.
based on the relationship between Slone Porter and the 7-Lle\en .Area facilities Manager.
The Agreement was not one between QMS and Tracy Cowley. There is no evidence of
record to support the Appellee's factual assertions.
Regarding paragraph "e". the statement is completely erroneous and is based solely
upone\ idenee. the Affidavit of Kerin Cowley, concerningstatements bySlone Porter during
an inter\ iew in Supplemental Proceedings long after the trial. The evidence is not of record
for purple- of this, appeal. That c\ idenee was not considered by the trial court and should
not be 11 ' '--wed for any purpose on appeal. Low v. Bonacci. 78 XP.2d 512.513 (Utah 1990);
Otteson Department ofHuman Services. 945 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah Cl. App. 1997).
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record of this case that AMS "reincorporated
as Quality Maintenance Systems. Inc.". that QMS was t ansferred in its entirety to Vealynn
Porter, or that payments pertaining to the buy-out agreement for AMS were made solely from
the funds "belonging to Veralynn Poller." On the contrary, the evidence presented to the
court below was that all payments made through the time of trial were drawn on the account
of QMS, as had been contemplated bySlone Porter and Tracy Cowley at the time AMS was
dissolved. There is no evidence of record anywhere in this case that Veralynn is somehow
the "alter-ego" of QMS. or that sheotherwise acted in a personal capacity in connection with
the buy-out agreement between Slone Porter and Tracy Cow ley for thedissolution of AMS.
Paragraph AC is based upon information not in evidence and unfounded speculation.
b. The Judgement Against Slone Poller should be reversed and vacated.
IheAppel ee's argument concerning the Appellant's argument onappeal is confused.
The Appellee's reliance on the Appellant's Affirmative Defense set forth in the Complaint,
and argument of counsel set forth in Appellant's Trial Briefsimply serve to emphasi/e that
there were two issues reser\ ed for trial. They were: (1) what were the terms of the parties'
agreement; and (2) whether there had been sufficient part performance by the parties to bring
the oral agreement under an exception to the requirements of the Statute of frauds, so that
the agreement is legally enforceable. Appellee and the court below have confused the issue
ol the existence ol an en Iok L.ible <igi cement with the issue of whether any parly is liable to
the other part)' for a "brca.!, of contract" under the agreement and/or whether there exists
some defense or bar to the enforcement of the agreement.
The issue of a claim for breach of contract, and. as importanth. an\ affirmative
defense to such a claim was now here set forth in any pleading, any trial brief, and nowhere
discussed by the court below in any pre-trial ruling oranalysis. There is nowhere stated that
the issues regarding whether any party had breached the agreement, and what remedy ought
to ensue from that breach, if any. were injected, inappropriately by the court below after the
close of the evidence in this case.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Slone Porter was and is entitled to "fair
notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the tvpe of
litigation involved." I'ishhaugh v. I 'tali Power A LightA)(^) P. 2c\ 403. 406 (I 'tab I90S). The
lair notice requirement is substantive. "If an issue is to be tried and a partv's rights
concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereofand an opportunity to meet it."
\ationai Farmers' Union Property A Casualty Co. \\ Thompson. 2N0 \\2e\ 249. 253
(19;o)(emphasis added). The Complaint and the lower court'sjudgment hav e fai led to meet
that requirement as to any claim ofa breach ofcontract ordefenses in response to that claim.
As a result, the lower court's judgment on the issue of a breach of contract, and the related
award of damages should be reversed and vacatcd due to lack of fair notice of (he erounds.
nature, and basis of the claim, and the failure of the court below to tr\ that case.
Ihe issue of a breach of contract, and any related affirmative defenses were not tried
in the court below. In fact, in pre-trial instructions to counsel the court \\ I. .w precluded any
evidence pertaining to an affirmative defense to such a claim, i a impossibility of
performance, misconduct ofthe plaintiff, etc.. b\ refusing to allow the parties to put on any
evidence of what had happened in the relationship between Slone Porter and 7-hleven. Inc.
as a consequence ofTracy Cowley's actions. It cannot be said in this case and on this record
that the issue of? breach of contract was tried by either express or implied consent of the
parties. The court in this case should not have and was precluded from basing its decision
on issues relating to a breach of the parties' contract. Contrast Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d
1172. 1176 (Utah App. 1995); Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44.U 6 n.2.
'fhe test for determining whether the pleadings should be deemed amended under
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) is [always subject to] whether theopposingpartyhada fair opportunity
to defend and whether it could offer additional evidence if the case were retried on a different
theory7" Colman v. Colman. 734 P.2d at 7X5 (citing R.A. Fold Const. Co. v. Marshall. 640
F.2d 266, 267 {10th Cir. 1981)). There is no support in die record in this ease that the test
has been satisfied to deem the Complaint sufficiently amended in this case. The decision of
the court below should be reversed and vacated.
Where the Complaint was not amended byexpress or implied consent of the parties
as per Rule 15(b). amendment by motion must conform with Rule 7. as well as other
applicable pleading requirements contained in Rules 8, 9. and 10. There is no exception
applicable in this case. Most importantly, "fal plaintiffcannot amend the complaint bv
raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to dismiss
or for summary judgment." Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38.13 1(chine
Thomason v. Nachtrieh.. 888 l;.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989); McDowell v. Sullivan. 1^2
I.R.D. 501, 502 (NT). 111. 1990)) (emphasis added). Likewise, the court could not amend
the Complaint for the Plaintiff under the circumstances of this case, by injecting its own
theory ofthe Agreement, and its own assumption concerning the parties' performance which
was prohibited from being tried, "fhe court below . in this case, was restricted to the grounds
set torth mthe Complaint. In the present case, there were introduced new issues or theories,
one before and two following trial which were not included in the Complaint, and which
were not tried by consent of the parties, fhe judgment of the court below which is the
subject of this appeal, is based upon to those new issues. As is evident from the record, the
introduction of those new issues severely prejudiced defendant Slone Porter and constitutes
reversible error by the court below under the circumstances of this case.
Appellee contends that merely raising the existence of an enforceable contract as an
aliirmative defense constituted a waiver of any objection to the lower court inline on the
unplcd claim ofbreach ofcontract and fashioning aremedy. Appellee cites no authority to
support that argument, because there is no such authority. That argument has no basis in fact
or law. If the parties reached an enforceable agreement to dissolve AMS. then that was the
end of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
It should be remembered that the Appellee, in the court below did not change his
theory to acknowledge any agreement pertaining to the dissolution of AMS. until after he
was laced with overwhelming evidence to the contrary in opposition to his first motion for
Miuimaiy judgment. The fact that an enforceable agreement was reached, does not. a
{•"•f.nrari. mean that either party breached the agreement or that either partv is liable to pay
damages stemming from a breach of thecontract. Particularly, where the Plaintiffdenies the
existence of any such agreement in his "Pleading" of record in the case, 'fhe judgment
against Slone Porter for breach of contract should be reversed, and vacated, and the lower
court instructed to enter a judgment fordefendant and dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
e. Veralynn Porter was properly dismissed as a party to (he case, which
ruling ol the court below should be affirmed.
This case, by the terms of the pleadings, is about the judicial dissolution of AMS.
This case is not about the "sale" of AMS to Slone and Veralynn Porter. It has never been
disputed that neither Kerin Cowley nor Veralynn Porter ever owned any portion or interest
in AMS as shareholders. On the contrary. AMS was owned by Slone Porter and Tracy
Cowley. Kerin ( owley has no standing to sue for the judicial dissolution of AMS. for the
same reasons. Veralynn Porter was an improper defeidanl in a case about the judicial
dissolution of AMS in which she owned no interest.
following the trial, and during the pendency of this Appeal. Plaintiff twice moved the
court below to reconsider and reverse its order dismissing Veralynn Porter. On both
occasions the knver court declined, afterextensive written briefing andoral argument bythe
parties.
Appellee'*, contention that Mrs. Porter should be reinstated as a party, and the
judgment en forced against her rests on two primarytheon.es: (1) that she "owned an interest
in the businc " of AMS. even though she was not a shareholder of AMS; and (2) that
Veralynn Poiiei personally assumed the obligation to pay the judgment debt. Both
contentions an lalallv Hawed.
1. Plainti ffs. throughout the case and even to the last moment of trial, vehemently
denied that kxhibit "7" constituted the Agreement between the parties pertaining to the
dissolution of AMS. It was admitted in evidence over the Plaintiffs vociferous objection.
Ihe Court made specific findings of a different oral agreement for the dissolution of AMS.
which did not include (he shareholders" respective wives as parties. Those factual findings
by the lower court cannot be said to be clearly erroneous on the record in this case.
It is not disputed that Yerlynn Porter owned 5()() aof Straight fine Striping. Inc. and
2V!(j of I.isto. LLC. However, it is likewise not disputed that Straight Line Striping was
purchased ultimately with funds from AMS1. and the properties which were held in I.isto
were purchased with funds of AMS. The properties were distributed from I.isto to Slone
Porter and Iracy Cowley respectively, according to their dissolution agreement which left
I.isto a shell company with no assets. The transfer of kisto was inconsequential in the
context of the dissolution of AMS. Appellee argues that SI S and I isto were "subsidiaries"
of AMS. That being true, they were thus assets of AMS. and the ownership of SLS and
Listo was nominal at best by Kerin Cow lev and Veralynn Porter. I hat did not make them
owners of AMS. which was "the business" being dissolved.
2. There is no evidence of record to support Appellee's theory that Mrs. Porter
has somehow personally assumed the judgment debt in this case. In .support of this argument
Appellee has cited no transcript from any proceeding vi examination, no affidavit or
Straight Line Striping. Inc. was ongnallv purchased hv Vcraknn Porter from a third
part}, and later, she was reimbursed the purchase cost bv AMS Sec. excerpts from the
Depositions of Kerin Cowley and Tracy ( ovvlev appended heiviu i he deport ions wore
admitted in ev idenee a trial.
statement under oath, no citation to any record, and none of the admitted evidence at trial to
support the his latest new theory for relief from the judgment of July 7. 2004. Appellee's
argument is based solely upon the proffer and argument of counsel, which is simply false.
This court is prohibited from reviewing this new theory under the circumstances of
this ease. Lowv. BonaccLlXX P.2d512,513 (Utah 1990); Otteson v. Department of Human
Services, 945 P.2d 170, 171 {Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Concerning Plaintiffs supposed "after acquired evidence" however, (here are
numerous, substantial and fatal Haws in Appellee's argument on appeal, first. QMS was
never a party to this ease. There is not. and can be no judgment of this court or the court
below against QMS obligating it to pay thejudgment against Slone Porter. Hecause there
is no judgment or obligation on the part of QMS to pay anything to Mr. Cow Icy. there can
be no obligation :o be "assumed1" by Veralynn Porter. Thus, the Plaintiffs contention that
Veralynn Porter should be rejoined in this case because she allegedly, personally or
individually. assumed the obligation of QMS to pay Plaintiff according to the agreement
between Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley is baseless, and impossible.
Second, even if a judgment had been entered creating a legal obligation owing by
QMS. there is no evidence now, and there was no evidence offered or admitted at trial, that
Veralynn Porter personally or individually "assumed" anydebt or obligation of QMS. Lor
' It should here he noted that Plaintiff did not take the deposition ofSlone IViler or
Veralynn Porter at any time during discovery in this ease, no -did Plaintiff request ;in\
information regarding the formation ofQMS. 'fhe discover} period was extended al ihe request
of the Cowleys until after January 2004, hut no additional discovery was sought of s!,,iK- Poricr
or Veralynn Porter.
anv such purported "assumption" to be enforceable under anv circumstances, such an
agreement or "assumption" would have to have been in writing under the Utah Statute of
frauds. There is no such writing, and no such assumption occurred. Lven in the tortured
analysis offered lately by Appellee, there is no such evidence and no such basis for the relief
sought.
Third, it should remembered that in a conference between the Court and counsel for
all parties, held in chambers immediately prior to trial, theCourt directed and instructed that
it would not hear or allow any evidence to be submitted concerning the then present status
ofQMS. including, but not limited to the fact that it had been fired by 7-fle\ en. Inc. because
ol I rae\ Cowley's lawsuit. In keeping with the Court's instructions, there was no evidence,
by way of exhibit or testimony offered by an}' witness at trial concerning the then present
ownership or status of QMS. "fhe trial was sole!}' about whether Tracy Covvlev and Slone
Porter reached an agreement pertaining to the dissolution of Advanced Maintenance
Services. Inc. ("AMS") and the terms of that alleged agreement, 'fhe trial was not about
QMS at all. nor was it about Slone Porter's ultimate ability to pay a judgment based on that
agreement. Now. after trial. Plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence concerning QMS's
ownership or status as of the time of trial and beyond, in order to modify the lower court's
original judgment. The injustice of that request is patent.
fourth. Appellee's contention is essentially that Mrs. Porter was the beneficiary ofa
fraudulent com eyance by Slone Porter of assets wInch would otherwise have been available
to satisfy the judgment. Plaintiff has offered no evidence from which anv court could
conclude that any "assets" of QMS or of Slone Porter were transferred fraudulently for the
purpose ofevading any creditor for purposes of Rule 64C(a)(4). In order for such a transfer
to be fraudulent, it must be made for no value and for no other legitimate reason but only to
escape attachment byjudgment. Again, the assets of QMS or any other entity not a party to
this case were not. and should not be, subject to thejudgment against Slone Porter. Further,
there is no evidence submitted or offered now by Appellee, and there was none at trial, that
any valuable asset of Slone Porter was transferred under circumstances constituting a
fraudulent conveyance. Appellee offered no evidence because none exists, and because there
has been no pleading asserting a right to recover against Mrs. Porter on the basis of a
fraudulent conveyance.
In the end. the court below properly dismissed Veralynn Porter and Kerin Cowley
because they were never shareholders of AMS. and because they were not parties to the
purported agreement between the shareholders. Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter, pertaining
to the dissolution of AMS as found by the court upon the totality of the evidence following
trial. There is no basis on which this Court may overturn the lower court's factual findings
underlying its ruling to dismiss Mrs. Porter. The Court's ruling properly had nothing to do
wilh the ownership or status ofQMS. or the ownership or use of assets by entities not a party
to the law suit, and should be affirmed by this Court.
d. Appellee is not entitled to an award ol*attorney's fees under I'tah Code
Annotated §78-27-56.
It is the well-established general rule in Utah, thai a party is entitled to attorney fees
oni} if authorized by statute or by contract. Meadowhorrk. LLC I. /dower, 95°. P.2d 115.
10
II7 (Utah 1998); Dixie Stah Bank v. Braikm. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Turtle
Management, Inc. l\ Haggis Management. Im .. 645 P.2d 667. 671 (Utah 1982). 'I here is
no provision in the subject agreement foy recover} attorney's fees, and the Utah Uniform
Corporations Act under which the Plaintiff filed his complaint does not prov ide for an award
ol fees in this case. Moreover, an award of attorneys foes under the so-called "bad faith"
statute is nowhere requested in the pleadings, and was not the subject of any argument or
evidence at trial, or by motion following the trial in the lower court, 'fhe issue was first
raised in Plaintiffs Post-trial Brief and Proposed findings of fact and Conclusions of Law.
1he issue was the subject of a hearing to the court below upon Defendant's objections to
those proposed findings. Plaintiffs proposed findings and conclusions were not accepted,
andthe court below prepared its own findings and Conclusions, which are thesubject of this
appeal. In those findings and Conclusions, the lower court expressly refused to award
attorney's fees to any party in the case. Rev iew of this matter is not a pure matter of law.
but rather one of fact to which deference is owed to the trial court's discretion. There is no
sufficient basis in fact or law to support overturning the lower court's judgment as to
attorneys fees under the circumstances of this ease.
As indicated in the Appellee's brief. aitorneVs fees may be awarded to a prevailing
part}' "if the court determines that the defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith." Utah ( e.de Annotated $78-27-56 (1953)(emphasis
added). The court below made a determiuat: c that Defendant's defense concerning the
existence of. the terms and enforceability of an oral contract for the dissolution of AMS was
not frivolous, or of little weight or importance, without basis in law or fact.
In this case. Plaintiff Appellee denied the existence of any agreement for the
dissolution of AMS until after his first motion for sumiraryjutlgment was denied. In point
of fact, the lower court found, expressly based on the evidence submitted in response to that
motion, that there was an oral agreement reached. The only issues remaining for trial, were
the terms of that oral agreement, and whether the oral agreement was enforceable under the
Statute of frauds so as to preclude a judicial dissolution all of which issues were hotly
contested by the parties through the close of trial.
Appellee in the present appeal is requesting this Court to replace its own judgment for
that of the trial court because the Porters, in comparison to the Cowlevs. lacked such
credibility as to render their "defense,n of an oral contract in this case frivolous, and in bad
faith. This Court has no authority to so replace the its judgment lor the that of the trial court
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. There is no record to support a finding of abuse
of discretion in this case.
In point of fact, the court below expressly found the defense concerning the existence
of an agreement to be meritorious even prior to trial, fhe court below determined that there
remained good faith disputes concerning materia! facts surrounding the oral agreement, 'fhe
fact that the lower court then went on after trial to disagree with both the Cowlevs and the
Porters concerning the terms of the oral agreement and its euloiceublii\ under the Statute of
Frauds, cannot be said to render the defendant's defense in lu.d faith lor purpose of the
subject statute.
Moreover, the Appellee far overstates his own eredibilin in the eyes of the lower
court, following the trial, in its Memorandum Decision, the court stated as follows:
45. Both the plaintiff and the defendant testified at trial differently than sworn
statements the}'gave in affidavits the filed with the Court at various statics of
the litigation in this case. The credibility of both the Cowlevs and the Porters
is difficult to ascertain.
R. at 1547-1560, 1552. (emphasis added) A copy of the Court's Memorandum decision is
appended hereto.
following the close of the ev idenee the lower court further observed:
11 If: COURU There was an oral amx-cment that was met on the
nineie^nthjifjLulvyyith respect to the four thousand dollar amount and that (inaudible)
wa^enlorccablc outside the statute of frauds because there was substantial part
performance. Or Icould find that there was not sufficienteither wavto establish that
there had been an agreement. And therefore there would be a need to value this
company a have judicial resolution of this company based upon the value that was
established and the propertv received h\ both sides in that there was clearly, both
sides agreed to a large portion of what the division was. * * * There are weaknesses
as I sec it in both sides :i: :i: *On the other side with respect to the Cow levs. they have
a hard time. I'm not going to tell you how 1would rule, have a hard time establishing
that there was an agreement for six hundred thousand dollars. Ifhe had accepted it
and signed that agreement on that date . . . enforce the agreement. That did not occur.
(Day Two. Tr. at 180-IS2)(attached hereto)
'fhe lower court was given the opportunity to determine whether the conduct of the
Defendant in asserting his defense was in bad faith. On balance, and upon consideration of
all ol the evidence at trial, the Court determined that its was not. There is no basis for this
court to overturn that decision under the circumstances of this case.
further, the Appellee's request for fees turns primarily upon the existence of what he
claims to be after-acquired evidence that was not admitted or offered at trial, and which has
nowhere been admitted or considered by the lower court. What Appellee is doing is offering
supplemental evidence to support its argument on appeal Such evidence may be offered and
accepted in a trial court in order to allow the trial court to modify the record when it is
inaccurate, incomplete or erroneous. Bawdcn and Associates v. Smith, 646 P1.2d 71 1. 713
(Utah 1982). I lowever, courts of appeal may not consider new evidence raised for the first
time in an appellate brief. Tow v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512.513 (Utah 1990); Otteson v.
Department ofHuman Services.945 P.2d 170. 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
in the present case, the Plaintiff made no motion or attempt to supplement the record.
The lower court did not receive or consider any of the new or supplemental evidence on
which Appellee now relies to support its argument on attorney's fees, or for the reinstatement
of Mrs. Porter as parly by means of a fraudulent conveyance. The Affidavit of Kerin
Cowley, and the related argument based upon that evidence should be stricken and cannot
support a reversal of the lower court's determination to not award attorney's fees under the
circumstances of this case.
Conclusion
In view ofthe facts and arguments set forth above. Appellant Slone 1). Porter requests
this Court to reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the ease to the trial court
with instructions to enterjudgment for Defendant Slone f> Porter and against PlaintiffTracy
Cowley and to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, and together with all
further relief the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
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Addendum
a. Memorandum Decision of the Court Below
b. Lxeerpt.s from the Trial lran>cript
c. L..\cerpt> from the Deposition of I racv Cow lev
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRACY COWLEY, ;>
Plaintiff, ,
)MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs. (
) Case No.030500244
)
SLONE PORTER. ,
Defendant. i
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on June 1-2. 2004.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant called witnesses and submitted documentary exhibits as
evidence. At the close of the trial, the Court asked the attorney's to submit in lieu of closing
arguments proposed findings offact and Conclusions ofLaw and any additional written
argument thev desired to submit.
The Court having heard and reviewed the ev idenee, and having reviewed the post trial
pleadings, makes the following:
ITNDINGSOFFACT
1. Ihe defendant, Slone Porter, was employed by 7-Eleven Inc. From February 1981
until November. 1995. when he was laid off.
2, irae;. ( ow ley was employed by 7-Lleven as the Area Facilities Manager in the
maintenance department, with responsibility for overseeing maintenance work at the stores and
for approving >-inside maintenance contracts for all 7-Lleven stores in Utah.
<4|U
3. 7-Elevcn published aCode of Business Conduct (CBC), Exhibit 9, that expressly
prohibited employees from engaging in conduct, which constituted aconflict of interest by
solicitation of gifts, entertainment and travel by asupplier, business relationships with outside
companies doing business with 7-Eleven and doing business with former employees of 7-Eleven
for a certain period of time.
4. Tracy Cowley, Sloan Porter and Bill Berg created acompany known as Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc. (AMS) in December 1994 for the purpose of entering into contracts
with 7-Eleven for general maintenance of its stores.
5. At the lime of the formation of AMS, both Mr. Cowley and Mr. Porter were prohibited
under the CBC from contracting with 7-LIeven, Inc., because of their past and current
employment with 7-EIeven. Mr. Berg served as the face and front for the company because he
was already doing work for 7-Lleveu as a landscape contractor.
6. On December 6, 1994, AMS was incorporated in the State of Utah (Exhibit 1).
7. Mr. Cowley, Mr. Porter and Mr. Berg held equal ownership interests in AMS,
although AMS never issued stock certificates nor any written document of any kind relating to
stock or stock ownership was ever created while Mr. Berg was involved with AMS.
8. Mr. Por;er and Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS was concealed from 7-
Elcven, Inc.
9. In June of 1997, follow ing arbitration between the three owners of AMS, Mr. Berg
departed as an owner of AMS. in e.msideration of payment of cash, the landscaping contracts
with 7-Eleven and two vehicles. Ihereafter. Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowley became equal owners of
AMS.
10. At the time Mr. Berg Int AMS. Slone Porter, now representing AMS with 7-Eleven.
?«'
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requested and received permission from Jim Craig, the division facilities manager and Mr.
Cowley's boss at 7-Eleven to own and operate A.MS as acontractor with ^-Eleven, even though
the CBC mandated time period had not passed from the time Mr. Porter had left 7-Eleven. Mr.
Cowley's ownership interest in AMS was again not disclosed.
11. During 1997, AMS acquired acompany called Straight Line Striping Inc. (SLS).
which was acorporation in the business ofpavement marking.
12. Jn May, 1998, at the recommendation of AMS's accountant. AMS acquired certain
life insurance policies, pertaining to Slone Porter and Iracy Cowley. As part of the requirement
for obtaining the life insurance policies. AMS and its two owners executed a written Stock
Redemption Agreement. Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowlc> L-SccuWxl the Slock Redemption Agreement
as shareholders, and Mrs. Porter signed die agreement as President ofAMS (Exhibit 2j.
13. Ihe Stock Redemption Agreement stated that it would terminate upon the dissolution
ot AMS. Ihe agreement is silent concerning the process or procedure or detail- relating to one
owner buying the interest of another while both are still living. 'I here was no ev idenee at trial
that AMS actually ever did issue stock.
14. In 2000, the Porter's and Cowley's formed a new corporation called I Em. Inc.
Ikisto), Eisto was used as a holding company tor certain real estate purchased i^inj AMS
money. Specifically, there were two rental properties: one located in Midway. I tab and the other
located in St. (ieorce. Utah.
15. Prom the creation of AMS until March M. 2001, kraev (\ >w lev c< mtaiucd his
employment with 7-Llcven. Inc.. and did no work direetU lor AMS. Mr. CowE
began receiving compensation from AMS in an amount which would make the ,
equal for both he and Slone Porter, taking into account Mr. Covvlev's salarv at ~-
'.' -ia:ie point,
mpensation
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d\^
16.Mr..lohandcBeschereplacedJimCraigasMr.Cowley'sbossat7-Elevenduriim
1999.Atsomepointintime,hebecameconcernedaboutMr.Cowley'sjobperformanceandhis
costreports.IlebegantoscrutinizethehillingsofAMS.DuringLehruary.2001,Mr.DcBesche
becameawarethattheCowlevsandthePortershadgoneonavacationtoHawaiitogether.Ik-
wantedtoknowfromMr.CowleywhetherAMShadpaidlorhisvacationtoIlavvaii.
17.Mr.Cowleyresignedhispositionwith7-EIeveneffectiveMarch31.2001.
18.Afterleaving7-Eleven,Mr.CowleystartedworkingwithAMSanddrawing
compensationequaltothatofMr.Porter.7-Elevenwasaw:rethatMr.Cowleywasanemployee
olAMS,butdidnotknowofhisownershipinterest.
19.AnnAtkinreplacedMr.Cowleyasareafacilitiesmanagerfor7-Eleven.Shebecame
concernedaboutthebillingpracticeofAMS.Shebegantoscrutinizeandcriticallyanalyzeeach
billandpaymentforcompliancewiththecontracts.SheexpressedherconcernstoMr,Porter.
20.1hePortersbecameconcernedaboutthepressuresputonthemby7-Elcvenandthen-
relationshipwiththeCowlevs.SlonePorterandhiswile.VeralynnPorterrequestedameeting
withTracyCowleyandhiswife.KerinonJune22.2002atiheAMSofficeinMidway.Utah.At
themeeting,thePortersindicatedtheywantedtobuyoutTracyCowley'sinterestinAMS.Ihey
offeredtopay$600,000.00incashinmonthlyinstallmentsof$10,000.00paidoverliveyears
withoutinterest,(otransfer100%ofSEStotheCowlevsandtogiveTracyCowleyhischoiceof
theI.istopropertieseitherinMidwayortheoneinSt.(.eorue.TheCowlevsweregiventwentv-
fourhourstorespondtotheofferSlonePortersaidheformulatedtheofferasonehewould
accept.ThePorterstaperecordedthemeeting,
21.TheCowlevswerestunnedwiththemeeting.OntheeveningofJune22.2002,Mr.
CowleycalledMr.Porterandsuggestedthatiftheofferwasonethathewouldaccept,heshould
s"\
accept it. and the Cowlevs would retain AMS. Mr. Porter refused the counter-offer, suggesting
to Cowley that if Cowley acquired AMS. 7-Eleven would discover that Cowley had been an
owner of AMS while working for 7-Eleven. then 7-EIcven would refuse to contract with AMS
and Cowley would not be able to pay Porter the required $600,000.00. Cowley expressed his
confidence that this would not happen.
22. Veralynn Porter on June 22. 2002. without the knowledge of the Cowlevs. contacted
Ann Atkin of 7-Eleven and informed her of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS throughout
the length of AMS's contracts with 7-Eleven. She also alleged that Cowley had threatened a
hostile take-over of AMS which would adversely affect the work of AMS for 7-EIeven. Ms.
Atkin requested the Porters to come to her home in IItah County, the next day on June 23. 2002.
23. At the meeting with Ms. Atkin on June 23. 2003, the Porters reviewed the total
history of AMS with her, and Mr. Cowley's involvement. Ms. Atkin informed the Porters that
she did not know what would happen between AMS and 7-Eleven, but that she would have to
contact Mr. DeBeschc and 7-EIeven's legal department to inform them ofthe AMS situation.
24. On the evening of June 23. 2002, the Cowlevs again met with the Porters at the AMS
office. The Porters peremptorily informed the Cowlevs of their conversation with Ms. Atkin and
their disclosure to her of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS. This disclosure rendered
moot Mr. Cowley's suggestion that the Porters sell AMS to the Cowlevs. The meeting was again
tape recorded by the Porters.
25. During the evening ofJune 23. the Cowlevs agreed among themselves that the
w.'itld accept the buy-out terms submitted by the Porters, with certain ehanees that Mr. C
w.uld .submit to the Porters on June 24. Mrs. Cowley was then committed to accompany a
cb.arch young groupon a trip out-of-state early on June 24.
ev
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26. On the morning of June 24. 2002. Tracy Cowley came to the AMS office and met
with Slone and Veralynn Porter. During that meeting, Mr. Cowley enumerated certain additional
terms which he would accept in selling his portion of AMS to Slone Porter, which items were
handwritten on a paper by Mrs. Porter (Exhibit 3). This meeting was also tape recorded by the
Porters.
27. These handwritten notes were then typed on a computer by Mrs. Porter. This
document was entitled "Partnership Buy-Out" ofwhich, two copies were printed. Mr. Porter
signed one and placed it back on the desk. Mr. Cowley said that the terms were agreeable to him.
but he wanted to read them to his wife before signing. Me attempted to call her but couldn't get
clear connection on his cell phone. The Porters then left for approximately an hour, taking Mr.
Porter's copy ofthe agreement with them. Upon returning, they found Cowley's copy left behind
with a note, "Vera- Call me. EC.A 'fhe Porters kept possession ofboth copies ofthe agreement.
28. Mrs. ('owlcy called Mr. Cowley that evening. They discussed a "no non-compete"
clause previously sought by Cowley, and determined not to change it.
29. On the afternoon ofJune 24, 2002, Mr. Cowley called Ann Atkin to verify the
Porter's assertion that SES could continue to do striping work for 7-Eleven. Atkin informed him
that 7-Eleven wot Id not do business with any company associated with Mr. Cowley. Mr.
Cowley later informed Porter of this conversation with Atkin.
30. Pursuant to instructions from Ms. Atkin, the Porters took steps to form Quality
Maintenance Systems (QMS), which the Porters incorporated on June 25, 2002 as owners to
continue the mam enance work tor 7-Eleven formerly done by AMS.
31. On Juik- 27. 2002. Tracy Cowley met with Johan dcBesche of7-Elcven in ameeting
also attended by Ami Atkin. Later that day, the Porters also met with dcBesche and Atkin. Both
Cowley and the Porters informed dcBesche that Cowley had agreed to sell out to the Porters and
would leave AMS. Notes ofthe meetings kept by Atkins indicate that the Porters showed
dcBesche the buy-out agreement signed by Slone Porter June 24. 2002. because there were
references to specilie provisions contained therein.
32. Mr. dcBesche agreed for 7-Eleven that the newly created QMS. without Mr. Cowley
being involved in the ownership could continue to provide the same services to 7-EIeven on a
time and materials basis.
33. After June 27, 2002, the parties began to perform the terms of the written buy-out
agreement of June 24th. Mr. Cowley vacated the AMS oflices in Midway, delivering the previous
AMS employees, equipment, stock accounts, hooks and premises to the Pollers. They divided
theS50.tKlti.00 cash funds of an AMS investment account. '1 here was a further division of
accounts receivables and transfer of the rental properties held by Usto. tranMer of SkS and its
equipment to Cowlevs and changing of the logos on premises and equipment from .AMS to
QMS. 1here was also a transfer of some vehicles to the Cowlevs
34. Ihe Cowlevs asked for copies of the tape recordings of the earlier meetincs. fhe
Porters always indicated they would prov ide them with copies of said tapes.
3:v Ihe parties met together on July E>. 2002 to discuss an hiventon ol'equipment and
suppleis belonging to AMS and SkS. Ihis meeting was not tape recorded as had been the pattern
irt the past. At this meeting, the Porters asked the Cowlevs to accept half the value (ifthe
inventory of equipment and supplier decreased In half the debt aiu^iied to the equipment beinu
retained by the parties. This was not acceptable to the Cowlevs.
30. 1ho Porters then indicated at the July 1T •meeting, thai i\\\;tHc WIS was
temporarily on a "time and material basis" pending the re-bidding ihe ""-f lev en contracts in the
•A
fall. QMS could only afford to pay Cowlevs $4000.00 a month and not the Si0.000.00 a month
they had previously offered and which the Cowlevs had ulfmately accepted, 'fhe $4,000.00
figure was a unilaterally arrived figure submitted by the Porters. At this meeting, the Cowlevs
again asked for copies ofthe tape recordings of the previous meetings. Mrs, Porter then replied
that she had destroyed them.
37. Slone Porter testified at trial that Tracy Cowley called him on the evening of July 19,
2002 and accepted $4000.0()/mo. for live years as a final agreement to purchase Cowlevs share of
AMS. 'fhe Cowleys testified they agreed to accept $4()00.00/mo., to help the parties out until the
contracts were rebid to see if QMS was awarded the 7-EIeven contracts, as they were currently
only being paid on a "time and material" basis and once QMS secured the 7-Eieven contracts, the
$10.000.00/nio. tor 60 months provision would be restored.
3S. On July 21.2002 the Porters filed Articles ofI) ssolution for AMS signed by Slone
Porter. This document purports that no agreement ofshareholders was necessary as AMS had no
shareholders.
39, In October. 2002. the Cowleys learned that QMS had successfully obtained 7-Eleven
contracts, although not exactly the same contracts as held by AMS. they were substantially the
same, and they had a similar monetary value.
40. Prior to June 27, 2002. both the Porters and Cowleys were receiving between
$10,000.00 and $14,000.00 per month in compensation from their ownership interest mAMS.
41 On October 21. 2002 the Cowleys demanded that the Porters bring the pa- i-ents for
the buy-out of AMS up to the ,$ 10,000.00/mo. level because they had successful re-obtamed the
7-Eleven contracts. The Porters said they would consider start making the $10,000.
payments and get :iaek to them.
mo.
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42. After being recontacted by the Cowleys concerning the $10.000.00 payments the
Porters responded that their attorney had advised them that the $4,000.00/mo. discussion on July
19th constituted an enforceable oral agreement to purchase Cowley's half of AMS for
$4.000.00/mo. for five years.
43. 'fhe Porters have paid the Cowleys S4.000.00 per month from August. 2002 through
the present.
44. The Cowleys subsequently filed this action against the Porters on Mav 15, 2003
wherein the Complaint and in asubsequent Motion for Summary Judgment they took the
position that AMS was improperly dissolved and asked this Court to judicially dissolve AMS
dividing the value of A.MS between the plaintiff and the defendant. Mr. Cowley subsequently
changed his position and asked the Court to enforce the buy-out agreement sset forth in Exhibit
*5. In pleadings filed since the trial herein, the plaintiff has changed his position again and again
asks the Court to judicially dissolve A.MS and set its value as of June 22. 2003 prior to the
Porters telling 7-Eleven management ofMr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS.
45. Both the plaintiff and the defendant testified at trial differently then sworn statements
they gave in affidavits they filed with the Court at various stages of litigation in this case. The
credibility of both the Cowleys and the Porters is difficult to ascertain by the Court.
46. Veralynn Porter testified at trial that she destroyed the tape recordings of the June
meetings by throwing them into Jordanclle Reservoir on aJuly 24, 2002 outing, which act made
them unavailable for use at the trial and was contrary to her representation that she had destroyed
them prior to the July 19 meeting of the parties.
47. Both parties were involved in a scheme to deceive 7-Eleven as to the actual
ownership of AMS over many years.
£y
RULING
"fhe Utah Statute of Frauds section 25-5-1 et seq. L.C.A applies to this case. Section 25-
5-4 states as follows:
"The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum
ofthe agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be changed with the agreement.
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from (he
making of the agreement..'"
fhe Utah Courts have established a part performance exception to the statute of frauds.
The Utah Supreme Court states that "the doctrine of part performance allows acourt of equity to
enforce an oral agreement, if it has ben partially performed, notwithstanding the statute of
frauds." Spears v IVarr, 44 P.3d 742. 751 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted). Therefore, ifthe
agreement has been partially performed, the requirementsof the statute of frauds are not
necessary.
'fhe Utah Supreme Court continued on to describe what is sufficient part performance in
the Spear case, 'fhe Spear Court states;
'fhe standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is as follows: (1) the oral contract
and its terms must be clear and definite; (2) the acts :lone in performance of the contract
must be equally clearand definite; and (3) the acts must be in reliance on the contract.
Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been performed had the
contract not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promisor would
result in fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be inadequate.
Reliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which could refer exclusively to the
contract.
V
Id. ^quoting Martin v. Sehoil. 678 P,2d 274. 2o (Utah I0K3).
Jhe alleged contract between the plaintiff and the defendant comes within the scope of
the statute of frauds because by its terms was an agreement that could not be performed within a
one year time period. It has been argued by the plaintiff that exhibit 5 meets the requirements of
the statute of frauds in that it is an agreement in writing signed by a party to be chanced with the
agreement. The agreement was signed by Slone Porter hut never by Tracy Covvlev. although he-
has testified that he would have signed it the same dav as Mr. Porter if he could have got through
to his wile on the telephone, fhe Court finds that most ofthe terms ofthe agreement require
action by Mr. Porter but there are certain terms that require action by Mr. Cowley, therefore the
Court finds that the agreement does not meet the requirements of the Statute of I rauds.
1he Court must now determine if there has been suftieient partial performance to take the
agreement outside the requirements of the statute of Irauds. In reviewing the standards set forth
in the Spears ease, the terms were clearand definite .!•. outlined in exhibit 5. There is now a
disagreement over whether the Porters were to pa> S^IIHIOO. or S240.000. to the Cowlevs. but
on hmc 24"-. there was no disagreement as to the amount. 1here was clear and definite
performance with respect to the terms ofthe agreement in that Mr, Cow lev delivered up the
assets ofAMS to Mr. Porter including the item ofmost value, the past contractural relationship
with 7-Eleven; Mr. Porter delivered the assets ofSI S to Mr. Cowley. The rental properties of
Eisto were divided between the parties: and existing cash assets of AMS were divided. The
Court finds that Mr. Covvlev' act.s in delivering the assets (d.AMS to Mr. Porter was in reliance
that lie was going to he paid ShOu nnn. over five >c.c- md receive the other benefits of the
agreement. Mr. Cowley would not have so performed st a contract had not existed between the
parties.
c&
The Court finds that the unilateral acts of the Porters in their interaction with
representatives of7-Eleven from June 23 to June 27. 2002 in disclosing the history ofVfr.
Cowley's ownership interest in AMS exerted pressure upon the Cowleys to sell their half of
AMS and breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing that exists between co-owners under
Utah Law.
Whether the agreement was for $4000.00/mo. payments over 00 months or whether the
agreement was foi $10,000.00/mo. over 60 months, the Court finds that on July 10. 2002. Mr.
Cowley agreed to a temporary reduction to $4,000.00/mo. because 7-Elevcn had reduced QMS's
compensation to "time and materials", but that the reduction was to be only until such time as it
was determined whether QMS would be awarded similar contracts from 7-Eleven as were held
by AMS. fhe Court has found that QMS was awarded similar contracts in October. 2002. The
award of similar contracts was a condition precedent to the contract teim of incrcasum the
monthly payments from $4000.00 per month to Si0,000.00 per month. Ihe ( ourt finds that there
was never an agreement to reduce the buy-out from $600,000.00 to $24(1.000.00 but only to
temporarily reduce the monthly payments from $10,000.00 .o $4,000.01).
The Court finds that there is no need to judicially dissolve AMS because the parties
entered into an enforceable contract wherein Mr. Porter agreed to bu\ -out Mr. Cow lev's
ownership interest pursuant to the basic terms set forth in exhibit 5. Ihe ( ourt finds (hat Mr.
Porter has been in breach ofcontract since October 2002 in die amount ot S6.0oo.no n]0. through
the present, and has an obligation to pay $10,000.00 a month from this lime forward until the full
$600,000.00 is paid in full. '1 he Court finds that all other terms of the e-mract have been
performed in full by the parlies.
Counsel for the plaintiff is directed to prepare findings of Pact. < ^elusions of Paw. and
v\H
\)
aJudgment consistent with this decision, submit it to counsel for the defendant for review and
then to the Court for execution
if1Dated this / day ol
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRACY COWLEY Et al,
Plaintiff,
vs
SLONE PORTER Et al,
Defendant
Case No: 030500244
Bench Trial
Judge Donald J. Eyre
PROCEEDINGS ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE TRIAL
BE IT REMEMBERED that on second day of June, two thousand
four, the bench trial in the matter of Tracy Cowley Et al vs
Slone Porter Et al was electronically recorded before the
Honorable Judge Donald J. Eyre of the above entitled court at
the Fourth Judicial Court building, Heber, Utah.
•14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Page Ixi
mute and have Christopher go meet with Diane and see if they
are mismatched. We have four exhibits (inaudible).
CLERK OF THE COURT: They match.
THE COURT: Okay. (inaudible) first ask, Mr. Smay, do
ou anticipate any rebuttal (inaudible)?
MR. SMAY: No. (inaudible) just fine.
THE COURT: Why don't you take a few minutes and
(inaudible).
MR. PRICE: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: We'll be recess for a few minutes.
(WHEREUPON THE TRIAL RECESSED)
THE COURT: There was an oral agreement that was met
on the nineteenth of July with respect to the four thousand
dollar amount and that (inaudible) was enforceable outside the
Statute of Frauds because there was substantial partial
performance. Or I could find that there was not sufficient
either way to establish that there had been an agreement. And
therefore there would be a need to value this company and have
judicial resolution of that company based upon the value that
was established and the property received by both sides in that
there was clearly, both sides agreed to a large portion of what
the division was. (inaudible) received certain assets and
there's no dispute between them that they had a right to
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'receive those assets with respecfc ,'i'^ ,!i
labout T agre«nt th^ talked
,. ^ "" y°U b— — - ^ -at ,ve heard
;hat *wouid - - —- - -gh. of June t;r
4 twenty-second, pri0r to 7-n VnI 11 knowing anything about the
>problems with Mr. Cowley. There are wea
weaknesses as I see it in£* —.. ««. ,.,„« „th. Pott.„ >id. tbeii<v>
-artners in a business. And to ™
lWU. g°' YOU kn°W' y°u might have,
'this is between partners n ~ -,
to 7-n and x,m not goang tQ cq
uc tne dishonesty thatIwas committed by both sides with respecfc fc .
. <_ P to 7-1l's involvement
but this particular lawsuit involves doesn't ,
' aoesn t involve 7-11 it
involves these two parties AnH «. uties. And to have gone to 7-11 behind
- Cowleys back and told the, of that, Xthlnk ±t _,_ ^
obngatlon that one partner has ^ another f ^ ^ ^ -
is, the value of it w3q *-^n
was the contracts it had with 7-11. other
- -y dldn,t have those contract^ ^ z_ ^^ ^ ^
But abusiness has more value as an ongomg business with
-PXoyees, with contraot3 ±n ^ ^ ^^
-ationships, goodwill and those type of things. !,ust make
tOSS ^^^ ^ thS ^ — "«* aspect to the Cowleys
— Have ahard time establishing that there was an agreement
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for six hundred thousand dollars. If he had accepted it and
signed that agreement on that date, that would have been
inaudible). (inaudible) enforce that agreement. That did not
ccur. So with those comments, I'd ask you Mr. Smay, for your
closing argument in writing. I would, I (inaudible), this is
an entire case that should have been settled. There is still
time to do that. You're all here. But I just make those
comments. I (inaudible) all the evidence.
MR. PRICE: Appreciate it, Your Honor.
MR. SMAY: (inaudible) exists (inaudible) you say the
Cowleys should prove the written agreement if they can and the
Porters if they can. It's also a possibility it seems to me if
they don't prove the agreement they have the same claim under
the Statute of Frauds to partial performance as do the Porters
do and that ought to be considered as well.
THE COURT: Yes. Ultimately. I would agree.
MR. SMAY: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. PRICE: Your Honor, we need a deadline for
submittal.
THE COURT: Is ten days sufficient?
MR. PRICE: I believe so, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Simultaneously in ten days?
MR. SMAY: Ten days, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes. Thank you, Counsel. Appreciate your
courtesy.
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meeting of Slone and me with Vera -- I mean Bill or me
concerning Slone and Vera when Bill was going away.
Q. A meet ing bet ween the two couples, the
Cow1cvs and r. \:e Porters •-
A. Co rrect.
Q- "- in the office at the Porters' house?
A. Correct. 1 remember another part. At the
t-1 ine -- it was the same time that we were being
appioached about buying the striping company.
Q. Who was approaching you about buying the
st riping company?
A. Terry Miller is the guy that we had been
using. And he was no longer going to do stripinq. He
just wanted to sell the equipment, and we had talked to
Bill about if. Bill did not want to get into striping.
He didn't want anything to do with it. He didn't think
the company ought to be buying it.
Kerin and I and Slone and Vera all felt it's a
greao opportunity. We need to buy it and get it going to
work. And that was all in the same time frame there.
Q. Veralynn eventually bought it herself, didn't
she?
A. She did. We had discussed the company buying
it. And she -- if I remember correctly, she had sold a
home and had a big commission and just went and bought
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Q- A real estate commission?
A' B'Jt: : ac r&-all specifically her being
ibursed every dime of the $15,000 it cos'- - buy thi
:r. ran
Q- By who?
A. By who?
Q. Yes.
A. By Advanced Maintenanc e Qp
•r.- e r "."i c e s
Q• So AMS re;mbursed her the $15,000 ?
A. Absolutely.
Q- For what purpose?
A. Because it was -- it was going to be one of
mpanies. She was reimbursed every dime of that
ney .
Q- Wna t was Karen Bingham's invo1vement wit h
straight Line Striping?
A. Her husband, he striped for us. He went to
worr: for us striping .
Q. Did Karen Bingham obtain an ownership
.:.teres:, in the company?
A. You know, I have read the affidavits. I
u _.: have to say I was n<t aware Karen Bingham was being
::ven '"' third ownership of Straight Line St
•HI- •"•:-' i• We found out -
riping when it
I found out months later.
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Q. How did you find out?
A. The time that I recall Slone told us and
T don't remember hew many months into it it was.
Slone told us and Kerin and 1 were a little unhappy about
tne fact tuat. they had been brought in and we didn't know
about: it. I bel ieve his comment at the time was , "Well ,
T>'ler ls going to leave his stripe work. I had to give
him something to get him to do it."
Q• Af t hat: P°i]' t m time who owned Straight Line
Striping?
A. My unde rst anding was before that point in
tj.me was it was owned by Karen and Vera.
0. What was that understanding based on?
A" Has-vi on our discussions in the office about
buying St ra iukt Line Striping.
Q. When was Veralynn Porter reimbursed in
relationship to when you found out about Karen Bingham?
A- ] believe it was prior to that. In fact, I
believe Vera was reimbursed witr.in 30 days of actually
giving Terry Miller a check. But I don't have the
records to be positive of that. But I know that
immediately ,;U,i her purchasing it, I was adamant that
she be reriii ,: ;.umi tor that, because that was our
discussion.
0. AMS just cut her a check so that AMS could
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then be the owner or you were going to make it the owner
with Veralynn and somebody else?
A. AMS cut her a check and it was -- the company
was under- the name of Karen and Vera.
Q. At some point in time --
A. I thought. Obviously it was under Karen,
Vera, and -- Karen Bingham.
Q. We need to make a chart of the Karens in this
case .
A. We are not short of any, that's for sure.
MR. PRICE: Where are we time-wise?
MR. PORTER: It's about four.
MR. PRICE: Is 4:00 okay to stop? Are you
okay with that?
THE WITNESS: That's fine with me.
MR. PRICE: It's kind of a place where we can
do that. So why don't we quit and we'll continue the
deposition on a date to be named later. I will contact
your attorney and see if we can schedule a date within
the next little while.
I need to go look at a couple of calendars to be
able to do that and one of them is not here right now.
So we'll be back with Mr. Smay. Hopefully we won't be
too far off and we'11 get everybody plenty of time to
look at schedules.
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that 1 ine was c reated.
Q. Okay. When did that happen?
A. Tli at 's not lung that belonged --
Q. W h e n d :i d that h a p pen?
T. I don't know when that happened; about three,
four years ago .
Q. And who as Karen Eiingham?
A. Veralyn's sister.
Q. What percent of the company did Karen Bingham
own?
A. One - tlii I'd - -
Q. V e r a 1y n - -
A. - - at that time.
Q. -- originally bought Straight Line Striping
h e r s ( If, d i d s he not?
A. She did.
Q. And do you have any knowledge as to how it
came about that Karen Bingham was involved?
A. No, I don't. I think that's something that
Slont 1 and Vera had worked out with them, unknowingly to
us .
Q. What do you mean, unknowingly to you?
A. Unknowingly to us. That's exactly what I
mean
Q. Veralyn bought the company; isn't that right?
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A. That is right.
Q. She paid her own money to buy the company,
A. She did. We had discussed buying it with
th-: :; . Ve: al yn went ahead and bought it herself .
Q. Right. She paid $15,000 for it, correct?
A . R ig h t .
0. Where did she get the money for that ?
A. I den't know.
Q. And so Veralyn bought it herself. And did
ye ••: o r you r husband ev er commun icate to Veralyn that you
r.:\-} a right, to be owners in Straight Line Striping cr
w. .' is to t. hat effect ?
A. Yes, be cau se we had an agreeme n t wi th Slone
that we were going to buy it too with them. Bill Berg
did not want to buy it. We never said we didn't want to
buy it. We always said we wanted to buy it. We thought
it wa s a good idea.
Q. Okay.
A. So we were always in agreement to purchase
t h ;t company.
Q. You were in agreement with who?
A. Veralyn and Slone. We wanted to buy the
cm: anv.
v - Oka' id you or Tracy Cowley invest any
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money in the purchase of the company, Straight Line
Striping?
A . N o .
Q. Did you or your husband ever invest any money
into AMS, Straight Line Striping, or Listo?
A. Yes, we did, as a matter of fact.
Q. When and in which company?
A. 1 couldn't tell you that. I don't have that
information in front of me right now. But I do remember
at 1east on two occasions fi11 ing out: financial
statements so that wo could go get loans or go get lines
of credit f or AMS.
Q. You don ' t. know when that was?
A. No. Veralyn would have all that information.
She has all the paperwork. We have none.
Q- We i1, foi a number of years there were no
lines of credit at AMS, were there?
A. ] don't know. I didn't run the office.
Q. Uid you personally ever sign on a line of
credit?
A. Y 1 did.
Q. I-'. : how much?
A. ; •-vj ]on 't. tell you . I'm not prepared to
answer that ir, '. orma t ion right now .
Q - W i.• it collateralized by anything?
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HA. don't think so.
Q. So eventually you became part owner in
Straight Line Striping; is that correct?
A. That's c orrec t .
Q. Fcr a period of time that was cne-1hird owned
by you and Veralyn and Karen Brigham?
A. rrec t.
Q. Then at some point Karen Bingham left, the
cc m p a ny; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Was she forced out?
A. You w o uId ha v e to ask her t h a t .
13 Q. Okay. And did she get pa 1d meney for her
interest in Straight Line Striping?
15 A. She did.
Q. How much?
17 A. My understanding is she got paid $15,000.
16 Q. Any equipment or anything else that came to
19 her out of that company?
20 A. Not that I can recall. I don't think so.
2 1 Q. Who paid the money to her?
2 2 A. Straight Line Striping did.
/. j Q. W a s it Straight Line o r w a s it A M S ?
2 4 A. I bel ieve it was Straight Line- St rip ing .
Q. Did Straight Line Striping e *.'•- .• bavr-
157
II
9
10
1 1
12
13
14
1
16
17
1
19
2 0
21
22
23
24
25
employees prior to the breakup of AMS?
A. I do not believe so.
Q. Did it do work?
A. Absolutely.
Q. It did work with no employees?
A. Yeah. Amazingly.
Q. Because they were AMS employees; isn't that
\. Yeah .
right ?
Q. They were paid by AMS?
A. That's right.
Q. All the bills were paid by AMS or Straight:
Line S trip ing?
A. No, not all the bills.
Q. What weren't?
A. I don't know. Ask Veralyn. She did the
account ing.
Q. I'm just trying to understand what the basi
for you knowing that not all the bills were paid by AMS
or Straight Line Striping.
A. Because when I received the book work,
obviously there were items that were listed in there
(indi cat ing. ) One of which I found it very interesting
that. Gail Stout was paid on the charitable contributi or;
line. 1 found that quite interesting.
